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I
At the end of a symposium and volume such as this, with its 
array of varied and brilliant papers, it is diffi cult to know what to say 
by way of conclusion other than to express my heartfelt thanks to the 
impressive contributors in this symposium-festschrift and to its superb 
organizers. One thing that I am convinced should not be done is to try 
to summarize the many papers presented and the discussions following 
them. We have had our say on these matters already. I do not want to be 
in the position of the speaker who announced, “I am afraid that I have 
spoken about these matters all too long, so please let me conclude once 
more.”
What I shall try to do is to generalize out of all the thought-
provoking papers we have heard and to say something about orality-
literacy studies themselves as a whole. I shall have the temerity to 
generalize as widely as possible, for I have chosen as my subject nothing 
less than “Orality-Literacy Studies and the Unity of the Human Race.” I 
do believe that what we have been about speaks in its own special way 
to the subject of human unity which is so urgent in our war-ridden and 
even war-mongering times.
II
Orality-literacy contrasts represent a new fi eld of study with 
a still undetermined but already vast range. The varied themes of the 
papers presented at this symposium manifest this range in impressive 
ways, and consultation of the literature they refer to makes the range all 
the wider. In the literature available today, orality-literacy studies have 
made their way into psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, anthropology, 
intellectual history, philosophy,
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including metaphysics itself, literary history (which over the centuries 
preserves oral residue in forms and intensities still not all accounted 
for), critical theory from reassessments of the old New Criticism and 
formalism to reader-response theory, religious history and theology 
(Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and other), and the theory and use of 
electronic communication. (This last comes into being following 
on orality and literacy but in its own way intricately involves both.) 
On the one hand, the computer extends the elaborated linear analysis 
introduced by writing to an unimaginable extent while, on the other 
hand, the telephone, radio, and television produce a world of what I 
have styled “secondary orality,” which fi lls the air with words, mingled 
with other sound. By contrast with “primary orality,” which is the 
original orality of human beings totally unacquainted with even the 
idea of writing, the world of secondary orality for its coming into being 
and its operation demands writing and print and now, more and more, 
computers themselves. Far from being destroyed by electronics, orality 
and literacy interlace in electronic communication more complexly 
than ever before—so much so that we have not yet developed adequate 
concepts and terms to describe the interlacing.
Orality-literacy studies are beginning to revise the history of 
academic education, at least that of the West, as they reveal the oral-
agonistic nature of schools until recently populated exclusively by males 
taught in a chirographically controlled but orally targeted language, 
Learned Latin, spoken by millions of males all of whom could also 
write it and yet governed in its expression by the all-pervasive art of 
rhetoric, which still maintained its original meaning of public speaking 
or platform address (Ong 1981).
Orality-literacy studies have even helped explain, in a recent 
article by James A. Aho, the invention of double-entry bookkeeping, 
which, it appears, was devised not to serve exclusively informational 
or theoretical ends but rather for rhetorical purposes, “to justify an 
activity about which there existed in medieval Christian Europe a 
considerable suspicion: namely, commerce” (Aho 1985:22). Double-
entry bookkeeping was calculated to persuade an audience by the exact 
balance of debit and credit that there existed an “ultimate harmony 
underlying the confl icting claims of the parties in a business transaction” 
(24), and to exercise its persuasion in an orally governed world. At its 
beginnings, account keeping was still physically involved in the world 
of rhetoric, the world of public speaking, for accounts were normally 
read aloud to
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the responsible party, whom we still today call an “auditor,” that 
is, a hearer (20; cf. Clanchy 1971:215). Our present-day term still 
surreptitiously memorializes the old oral-aural world. In a residually 
oral culture you understood what the fi nancial facts were if you heard 
about them better than if you looked at rows of fi gures.
At the risk of seeming to range altogether too far afi eld, I might 
note that awareness of orality-literacy contrasts may even be of some 
use in pongid linguistics. Procedures used in trying to teach speech to 
the Pongidae or great apes—mostly, in fact, to chimpanzees—appear 
often to be based unwittingly upon a model of language provided not 
by talk but by literacy. The apes are fed oral language word-by-word, 
as though they were working with word lists. Children do not learn 
languages quite this way. While it is true that at certain stages they do 
of course pick up some individual words individually, their learning 
processes are basically much more complex. They sense that in the 
vocalizations of older persons something is going on that they want to be 
part of. They want to “get into the act” which discourse is (Heath 1983: 
passim). There is little indication that apes want spontaneously to “get 
into the act” of human discourse (De Luce and Wilder 1983), and even 
less that they are constructing a whole world for themselves by dealing 
with language and its densities, as Piaget has shown children always do. 
Little wonder that apes are far more successful at manipulating counters 
by hand or at using hand signals than at mouthing words, for which both 
their articulatory apparatus and their neurophysiological organization 
have ill prepared them.
III
The reason for the extraordinary diversity that attends the study 
of orality-literacy contrasts and for the usefulness of these contrasts in 
coming to a better understanding of deep human concerns is not far to 
seek: it is that these contrasts ultimately settle so deeply into the human 
psyche. Persons who have deeply interiorized literacy can no longer 
separate literacy from their natural mental process, as I have tried to 
explain in detail in Orality and Literacy (1982).
Cultures are polarized across the world today between 
effectively literate, high-technology cultures and cultures still largely 
oral (with varying but notably restricted degrees of literacy), lacking 
high technology. Within high-technology cultures,
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such as that of the United States, a similar polarization on a lesser scale 
often exists between effectively literate populations and illiterates or 
marginally literate persons, often from ethnic subcultures. Roughly 
speaking, these poles of literacy and orality commonly, if not always, 
represent the haves and the have-nots in our present world. Literate, 
high-technology cultures have often treated those at the other pole of 
human existence by resort to concepts such as the “savage” mind or the 
“primitive” mind or the “prelogical” mind (which is to say the illogical 
or at least the sublogical mind) or even by resort to Lucien Lévi-Bruhl’s 
more outspoken “inferior cultures”—Les Fonctions mentales dans les 
sociétés inférieures (1910). In his recent Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes Its Object (1983), the Netherlands anthropologist 
Johannes Fabian has reported on the ways in which Western (of course 
literate) anthropologists have in the past regularly, if unconsciously and 
subtly, downgraded the (generally oral) peoples who have in the past 
commonly been the subjects of their research. This condition has been 
bettered now, no doubt in part because anthropologists have enlarged 
their original dominant interest in “primitive” or “lower” peoples to 
include in their purview all of us human beings. The enlargement of 
the fi eld has brought improvement of vision and greater tolerance and 
understanding.
As I have suggested in Orality and Literacy (1982:174-75), 
we can avoid the earlier invidious terms by translating the difference 
between the two poles as that between literate and oral peoples. I do not 
mean to suggest that orality or other cultural features are exactly the same 
in all cultures without writing any more than that all literate cultures use 
literacy exactly the same way, but simply that, as noted earlier, there are 
common characteristics that mark the speech and thought of primary 
orality and that contrast saliently with certain features of literate cultures, 
not to mention print and electronic cultures.
We should note here also that, applied to an entire culture, the 
term “oral” is preferable also to “illiterate,” which is subtly downgrading, 
designating a culture by something it lacks that we have. (Sometimes, 
of course, “illiterate” is useful to refer to persons in a basically literate 
culture who have not learned to read and write.) Orality is a positive 
trait, which literate cultures also have—though in a different way. We 
still talk, perhaps even more than our ancestors in primary oral cultures. 
But we do not talk in
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the same style or out of the same thought-forms. An oral culture’s 
thought-forms are just as human as ours—one could argue in certain 
ways more human, for they do not draw on the technology of writing, 
which is, as all technologies are, a human invention but which is also in 
some way external to the human being.
What happens when we substitute for “savage” or “primitive” or 
“prelogical” or “inferior” or similar denigrating terms the term “oral”? 
Basically, I would suggest, it can give us a new experience of the unity 
of the human race, diachronically and synchronically. Let me suggest 
some ways in which it can do this.
First, a clear continuity is established between oral cultures, 
ancient and modern, and ourselves. Writing, it is true, marks a dividing 
line, but, once we know basically what writing does to thought and to 
consciousness itself, we know in some sort what the dividing line is and, 
in general, what the effects are once it is crossed. Writing is a technology 
that restructures thought and consciousness. It is not, as I have indicated 
earlier, the only development that affects thought and consciousness, 
but it is the most radical and pervasive across the centuries and across 
the surface of the globe.
Knowing the effects of writing on ourselves, knowing how 
much of what we consider simply human is due to the appropriation of 
writing, we can enter into the state of consciousness of oral peoples—
never directly, but refl ectively. And refl ective entry has even some 
advantages over direct entry, for primary oral cultures can hardly 
refl ect on orality as such by contrast with the literacy they do not know. 
Entering oral consciousness refl ectively, we can experience the people 
there as our brothers and sisters. We can feel what we are like without 
the support of writing technology. Their thought processes—many of 
them, though certainly not all—differ from ours not because they are 
“savage” or “inferior” but because they are what the oral economy of 
managing language and thought demands. Oral peoples can have high 
intelligence and can be very wise. They are what we ourselves are like 
apart from the support of the writing that has penetrated our psyches so 
deeply that we can never entirely separate it from ourselves. Knowing 
the nature of orality-literacy contrasts, we can more deeply empathize 
with the Homeric Greeks, the old Anglo-Saxons, the modern Seneca in 
the state of New York, the present-day African Nyanga people in Zaire, 
the West
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African Mande, the modern Mongols, the Javanese, and the rest of the 
peoples in the more than ninety different oral language and cultural 
areas reported on by John Miles Foley in his Oral-Formulaic Theory 
and Research (1985). (It should be noted that in the case of many of 
these peoples literacy is not entirely unknown, but that a high degree of 
primary orality still informs their cultures.)
Of course, anthropological studies of many sorts in recent 
times have done much to create empathy and genuine human bonds 
of nonpatronizing affection between anthropologists from literate 
cultures and oral peoples. But none, I think, can range farther or more 
deeply than orality-literacy studies. The reason is profound. Writing is 
the technology which in a signifi cant way marks the deepest encounter 
between human consciousness and the exterior, nonhuman world.
Secondly, since writing takes possession of consciousness 
and culture slowly and in ways conditioned by the variances between 
cultures, if we know both sides of the orality-literacy watershed, we can 
empathize with the intermediate stages between primary orality, early 
scribal literacy, academicized literacy, and all the other literacies which 
vary so kaleidoscopically as to make a simple defi nition of literacy quite 
impossible. Since literacy touches so much in culture—commerce, 
craftsmanship and industry, family structure, religious institutions, 
political structures and behavior, and all the rest—we can put ourselves 
in contact with the entirety of another culture’s life. Literacy, we must 
note again, does not explain everything in a culture, but it relates to 
almost everything, and in myriads of ways. It does so in our own lives, 
where we live in orality-literacy contrasts multiplied beyond measure 
in the new electronic media. Our deep involvement in these contrasts 
can bring us a deeper understanding of others who differ from us only 
in that their cultures bring them to live out in different ways problems 
we all share.
Mention of the new electronic processing of the word suggests 
a third way in which familiarity with humankind’s originally oral world 
and thereby with orality-literacy contrasts can enrich our sense of the 
unity of the human race. For orality-literacy studies look simultaneously 
to the past and to the future. Some of the most attentive reading about 
orality-literacy contrasts—contrasts in times past as well as present 
contrasts—is done today by persons in radio and television work. I can 
testify from personal experience
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that such persons are as likely to attend lectures I give on orality and 
literacy as are persons teaching ancient Greek epic or Beowulf or modern 
African folklore. The ages of primary orality, chirography, typography, 
and electronics, despite their radical breaks with one another in some 
ways, in other ways form a continuum. As we have seen, the electronic 
age has maximized both orality and the effects of writing and print. 
This age of secondary orality has maximized oral utterance through the 
telephone, radio, and television in ways unknown to oral peoples, and 
yet at the same time has maximized the analytic, linear processing of 
thought and expression which writing initiated to a point unimaginable 
in a purely writing and/or print culture. Electronics, in other words, 
builds up both orality and literacy, but the orality and literacy which 
emerge from an electronic culture are not quite the same as pre-electronic 
orality and literacy, from which they differ in organization and in social 
import.
The effects of the computer on the thought and consciousness 
formerly supported by literacy have not been assessed as yet in anything 
like full depth. Pop psychology and pop sociology tell us nothing of 
what is really happening. They themselves are part of the media “hype” 
that spins off automatically from the culture they pretend to assess. To 
understand the effects of the computer on thought and consciousness we 
need disciplined study, which can profi t from use of the computer where 
this is helpful (it is not always helpful, let alone necessary, in assessing 
some of the effects even of the computer).
Fourthly and fi nally, orality-literacy studies raise a question 
which is so profound and mystifying that it has seldom if ever been 
treated, to the best of my knowledge. That is, what is the relationship in 
depth between human consciousness and technology at the point where 
consciousness and technology enter into the most intensive alliances? 
Thousands of books on technology exist and hundreds more come out 
every year. How many of them take cognizance of the following facts?
(1) The human mind needs to use an extraneous technology, 
writing—and if you do not believe that it is extraneous, read Plato’s 
Phaedrus and his Seventh Letter—in order to create what we style a 
scientifi c treatment of any subject. Oral cultures have great wisdom, but 
none of them have the extended, analytic explanation of the world that 
we call science today, in the large sense of this word, including not only 
the physical sciences but also
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the humane sciences, such as the study of verbal utterance, written or 
oral.
(2) As Havelock’s recent monograph, “The Linguistic Task of 
the Presocratics” (1983), has painstakingly shown, before writing had 
taken possession of the Greek consciousness, the central question of 
metaphysics, the nature of being, Aristotle’s to ti ēn einai, could not 
effectively suggest itself to the human mind. All science needs writing in 
order to achieve the tight, sequential, linear, “logical” organization that 
science requires. But metaphysics needs writing not only to organize 
itself analytically as a science but also to become aware of its quarry, 
being or existence as such. Oral cultures concern themselves with doings, 
with happenings, not with being as such: they narrativize their own 
existence and their environment. Metaphysics is not fond of narrative. 
It wants to know what a thing is, and ultimately what is or being or 
existence itself is. To oral peoples, such questions appear trivializing. 
What does all this say about the intimate relationship of the deepest 
interior of the human mind to technology? Without the technology of 
writing, it appears, the mind cannot fi nd, or even take an interest in, the 
subject-matter of metaphysics.
(3) Why was it that the fi rst machine working with replaceable 
parts to mass-produce complex objects themselves made up of 
replaceable parts was not a machine to manufacture swords or shoes or 
guns but, rather, the printing press, which manufactured books for the 
use of the human mind? What does this say about the relationship of the 
human mind to mass-producing technologies which have succeeded the 
printing press in countless numbers today? Can we dream of humanizing 
them as we have humanized writing and print? We had better do more 
than dream about doing so, or we are lost.
One truth stands out here. These two crucial and pervasive 
technologies, writing and print, were developed at the service of human 
consciousness, of the human interior, of the spirit, the soul, not at the 
service of operations directly in the exterior, material world. The human 
mind took them into itself for its own use—a use not always morally 
good, not always unselfi sh, but human nevertheless. The human mind 
relies on alliance with the external world for its own interior work much 
more than we have been aware. But the human being also has the power 
to convert the external world and its technological operations there into 
something of deep spiritual worth. Orality-literacy studies can at least 
alert
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us to the truth that technologies grow out of the interior human lifeworld 
and need constantly to be referred back to that world, where we ourselves 
live as human persons.
It seems a far cry from the relatively simple technology of 
writing or even from print to the vast technologies whose products we 
know today—an automobile, an airplane, a spacecraft, an automated 
automobile manufacturing plant. The line from writing to print to the 
computer is really a direct line, as earlier suggested, moving toward 
greater and greater linear, quantifi ed, analysis achieved by more and 
more refi ned management of local motion. Yet writing, print, and the 
computer are all ways of technologizing the word. The other gargantuan 
technologies have mostly to do with the creation of machines or other 
products for physical use—high-rise buildings, for example—that 
themselves have nothing to do with technologies for the management of 
thought and expression.
Yet the management of thought and expression has more and 
more to do with them. These gargantuan technologies are more and 
more the products not just of writing and print but of computerized 
technologizing of the word. Through the computer, the technologized 
word is reaching deeper and deeper into the heart of our ordinary 
lives. That is to say, today the alliance of thought and expression with 
technology that began with writing is becoming more and more intense. 
What does this say about human responsibility? Plato had Socrates 
protest that writing is destructive of human values—and then went 
ahead to put this observation into writing. Writing did not destroy 
human values, but it made it necessary to handle them on a different 
basis—in terms of more abstract principles (see Havelock 1978). Print 
brought new problems of value management. And computers bring still 
more. Somehow, we must fi nd a way to interiorize the resources of the 
computer, to humanize them as we have humanized writing and print. 
The task is overwhelming and I have no easy directives for carrying it 
through. But we must manage. Otherwise, it is star wars forever.
What we need ultimately is a new and more comprehensive 
cosmology that takes into account both the close connections of the 
human person with the physical universe and the utter difference of each 
human person—the “I” that you and I each speak—from the physical 
universe. The old Aristotelian cosmology is long outmoded, but neither 
Copernicus nor Galileo nor Newton nor
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Lamarck nor Darwin nor Marx nor Einstein at all suffi ce any more, 
although we can learn from all of them. None of these allow for such 
possibilities as computerized genetic engineering, which poses moral 
problems earlier human beings could not even conceive. We need an 
open cosmology—something, perhaps, like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s 
in The Phenomenon of Man: human beings are phenomena within the 
physical universe who in their self-consciousness also break out of the 
physical universe. But Teilhard when he died in 1955 did not yet know 
very much if anything of computers or of orality-literacy contrasts. 
Human self-consciousness, with the refl ectiveness it entails, has made 
thought and language and has created the alliance between thought and 
language on the one hand and on the other the technologies of thought 
and language, writing, print, and electronicized verbalization. The 
meaning of the technologizing of the word lies very near the center of 
the meaning of the cosmos in its relationship to the human being and of 
the human being in relationship to the cosmos.
The cross-cultural understanding which orality-literacy studies 
make possible enriches the human spirit and opens the possibility for 
greater understanding and love between diverse peoples and for greater 
understanding of the intimacy with which technologies relate to human 
life. But it is not a cure-all for human misunderstanding and greed and 
ambition. I am under no illusions that orality-literacy studies will be any 
more redemptive or any freer of human failings than other purely human 
efforts. Still, the more human human beings are, the more there is in 
them to be redeemed. Orality-literacy studies can enlarge our humanity 
and open it more to redemptive powers beyond mere human reach.
However, although orality-literacy studies are not redemptive, 
nevertheless such studies can open new depths in our understanding of 
the work of redemption as known to Christian faith—and doubtless in our 
understanding of other religious beliefs, for which I shall not undertake 
to speak here. Beneath the text of the Bible lies a vast oral tradition. 
This biblical scholars have long known. But, until the recent intensive 
study of orality-literacy contrasts, the psychodynamics of oral modes 
of thought and expression have been very inadequately understood by 
biblical scholars as by others. We have been handicapped, as literates, 
for we have commonly, if unwittingly, interpreted oral thought and 
expression as a variant of literate thought and expression—in effect, as 
literate thought and
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expression that simply failed to get put down in writing—instead of 
assessing oral thought and expression on their own grounds, which are 
quite different from those of literacy. Yet, because of its orally grounded 
prophetic and witnessing cast, the Bible is very likely the most variegated 
orality-literacy mix we have in any text. Moreover, despite the radical 
primacy that the biblical text has in Christian tradition, the Word of God, 
who is the Son, is to be thought of by analogy with the human spoken 
word, not the written word. Our growing appreciation of the economy 
of oral thought and expression promises to deepen our understanding of 
the word of God in the fullness of all its various senses, to provide new 
insights for biblical studies and thereby for the study of salvation history, 
that is, of the work of redemption itself as this manifests itself in biblical 
faith, as well as new insights into the other religions of the world which 
rely on texts developing out of unimaginably rich oral prehistories.
Saint Louis University 
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